In July 2015, a Trade Union Bill was introduced by the incoming Conservative Government which seeks to place significant restrictions on UK trade union activity, probably in anticipation of deep budgetary cuts affecting the public sector which are likely to generate protest. The assertion has been made that this legislative proposal is fair and balanced. We contest that claim with reference to the likely effect of the measures on industrial action, pickets and protests. The consultative process was incomplete and the substantive provisions unfairly target union-organised strikes * Professors, University of Bristol Law School. We are grateful to Shae McCrystal and other
presented a brief Trade Union Bill: European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
Memorandum which accepted that some of the measures proposed (although not all were considered) will engage a number of key human rights (in particular, Articles 6, 11, and 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1), but denying breach in each case on the basis that the measures are justified and proportionate. 18 The Government relied on a wide margin of appreciation being given to the UK under Article 11, but ignored Article 10 and much relevant case-law, and failed to deal comprehensively with all the potential effects of the Bill. In this respect Liberty has commented that:
Ideological motivations of any Government are part and parcel of politics but should not imperil the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals. Yet this relatively short Bill has the potential to cause significant damage to fair and effective industrial relations in this country and would set a dangerous precedent for the wider curtailment of freedom of assembly and association. 19 Most notably of all, compliance with ILO or ESC standards is not mentioned once in the Memorandum or the Consultation Papers. 20 The UK has been a member of the ILO since its establishment in 1919 and was the very first State to ratify ILO Further, the UK ratified another key instrument adopted in the Council of Europe, the ESC of 1961, and agreed to be bound by Article 5 (the right to organise) and
Article 6 (the right to bargain collectively, including in Article 6(4) the right to strike) 18 See BIS/15/466 (2015) , Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trade-unionbill-european-convention-on-human-rights-echr. 19 Liberty's briefing on the Trade Union Bill for Second Reading in the House of Commons, cited in House of Commons Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 828. 20 The potential breach of UK obligations in this regard was raised by Angela Eagle at the second reading debate: see HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 779. without reservation. 21 The relevant supervisory body, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), has recently, through the collective complaints procedure, referred to established ILO supervisory jurisprudence 22 and reiterated the significance of 'the right of workers and trade unions to engage in collective action for the protection of economic and social interests of the workers'. 23 In January 2015 the ECSR, through its basic reporting procedure, issued recommendations relating to UK law on the right to strike, which it considers unsatisfactory as it stands. 24 ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 (and others), the findings of ILO supervisory bodies and the ESC and ECSR decisions are all highly relevant to the application of Article 11 of the ECHR. 25 Serious concerns have been raised about the lack of evidence in the Consultation Papers and Impact Assessments, leading the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) to declare all three Impact Assessments 'not fit for purpose'. For example, it said that the Impact Assessment on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services 'does not explain 21 For ratification as at 1962 and subsequent declarations under Article 20 and in respect of other provisions, see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=035&CM=1&DF=&CL=EN G&VL=1. 22 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and present the rationale for the proposals in a straightforward and logical way', and fails to provide 'a clear enough basis for consultation' or sufficient evidence. 26 The extremely brief, essentially one page, discussion in the Consultation Paper on hiring agency staff discusses strikes in public services when the measures extend to all sectors. 27 The central assumption in the accompanying Impact Assessment, that about 22% of the days lost to industrial action in the UK could be covered by agency workers, was based on insufficient data according to the RPC. 28 The Consultation on Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers makes extensive reference to 'evidence' presented to the Carr Review 29 yet only records in a footnote that these were allegations, not findings. 30 It fails to mention the Carr Review identified 'the lack of a significant enough body of evidence to support any recommendations for change '. 31 The Bill is notable for the width of criticism directed at it, not only from trade 32 See Joint Statement, available at: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releasesand-statements/trade-union-bill-represents-major-attack-civil-liberties-uk. relations between employers and unions and harden attitudes, producing various unintended consequences. 33 In this article we consider the key aspects of the proposed reforms designed to control or prevent strikes, pickets and other forms of union-organised protest, including those on which the public was not invited to submit comments in the consultation prior to the Bill's passage through Parliament. The highly significant reforms relating to political funding and the role of the CO have been the subject of critical comment elsewhere. 34 Since records began in December 1931, the highest working days lost in industrial action was 32.2 million for the year preceding April 1980; the lowest was 143,000 for the 12 months to March 2011. 35 On this basis, the Government's estimate of an annual 675,000 working days lost to industrial action 36 seems excessive, but is perhaps in anticipation of further resistance to public sector cuts. We seek to identify practical problems with the proposals, and where they may breach ECHR, ESC and ILO obligations. But perhaps the strongest indictment of the measures is their clear potential to undermine further the relationship between workers (and their unions) with employers, with the potential for: greater disruption and use of leverage campaigns, such as withdrawal of good will, work-to-rule, protests, demonstrations and unofficial action. Paradoxically, the Bill might result in more working days lost to industrial action ... 37 33 Available at: http://www.cipd.co.uk/pm/peoplemanagement/b/weblog/archive/2015/09/09/trade-unionreforms-are-outdated-response-warns-cipd.aspx. 34 
RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO (AND THE EFFECTS) OF STRIKES AND

OTHER INDUSTRIAL ACTION
Through a multitude of measures the Bill aims to restrict the ability of unions and workers to take industrial action, especially where it may affect the delivery of public services. New balloting thresholds, more detail on ballot papers, longer periods of notice, a reduced ballot mandate period and new powers to use agency workers as strike-breakers are the chosen methods.
New rules on balloting thresholds
Like earlier Conservative legislation, 38 one of the main targets of the Bill are the rules on industrial action ballots, compliance with each of which is a pre-condition of trade union immunity from liability for calling industrial action. 39 In addition to the existing requirement in s.226(2) of a majority voting in favour of the strike, Clause 2 adds the requirement that at least '50% of those who were entitled to vote in the ballot did so': in other words, at least half of the ballot constituency must actually vote. Under Clause 3, a further '40% support requirement', is imposed in respect of 'important public services' and 'ancillary' services, so that at least 40% of those entitled to vote in the ballot must have given their approval. Ancillary staff are said to include 'managers, administrators or cleaners: any role that supports others to deliver important public services' whose absence would have an adverse impact on the delivery of the service. 41 In both cases the detail of the particular roles and functions will be in future secondary legislation which has not yet been published in draft form, with the risk that the time for proper debate on this critical issue is short.
That these balloting requirements are placed foremost in the legislation is unsurprising, since these two provisions are likely to have a serious impact on industrial action. Ralph Darlington and John Dobson have observed that, on information gathered in respect of turnouts for past industrial action between 2002 and 2014, only 85 out of 158 strike ballots would have met the 50% threshold, and that it is much more difficult to secure the threshold in larger strikes reaching across a sector. Of the 158 strike ballots analysed, only 440,000 workers achieved a turnout rate over 50%, while 3.3 million workers would have been debarred from taking lawful action. 42 The effect of the 40% threshold in important public services, however, 'would have very little further effect' (their emphasis), 43 particularly in fire service and transport (where the FBU and the RMT tend to obtain large turn outs 40 BIS/15/418 at 10-11. 41 Ibid., paras 19-20. and overwhelming majorities). 44 Despite this potentially serious impact, the Consultation Paper and the Impact Assessment focus exclusively on the 40% support threshold and ignore the 50% turnout threshold. 45 The result is that the Government has completely ignored the practical difficulties unions face in contacting its members by post in some industries, especially those with a fragmented workforce. 46 The Consultation on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services gives three justifications for the thresholds: that disruptive action on the basis of low ballot turnouts is 'undemocratic' (the first and last mention of 'democracy'); 47 'to ensure that industrial action is only used as a measure of last resort'; 48 and the far-reaching effects of strikes in public services. No evidence is offered to explain which unions or workers use strikes other than as a weapon of last resort. Postal ballots are already very expensive, and the risks to the workforce and their union of strike action are significant (such as deductions from wages, risk of dismissal, and very costly interim injunction applications). Unexplained is why more stringent voting requirements should apply to unions than in fact are obtained in national or even European democratic elections in which turnouts are notoriously low. 49 The third justification only relates to action taken in 'important public services', with important slippage 44 Ibid., at 29-30. 45 from the language of 'essential public services' in the Queen's speech. 50 It cannot apply to the 50% threshold.
Special provision for 'important public services' or essential services
There is no precedent for the term 'important public services' in either international 52 Ibid., paras 570-1. 53 Ibid., para. 585. 54 Ibid., paras 578-9. 55 Ibid., paras 578 -585. See too the existing offence in TULRCA s.240. the aim is to prevent such serious harm, it is unclear that this should be done through restrictive balloting requirements (such as the 40% support threshold). In some core 'essential' services, such as fire, the threshold is likely to be met; in other, less essential ones, it may not be. Instead, a minimum service, which as the Consultation Paper notes 56 is already utilised in the event of action in the fire service, makes more sense in ensuring that the public service continues to be delivered, and is a mechanism endorsed by the ILO. This is also a method endorsed in such extreme cases by the ECSR. 57 Education is not regarded as an 'essential service' by the ILO CFA because temporary interruption of schooling does not endanger 'life, personal safety or health'. 58 Teachers retain the right to strike without interference, despite some inconvenience and financial burdens for parents (and their employers). Nor, more generally, does the broader economic impact of industrial action render a service 'essential'. 59 The CFA states clearly that: 'The possible long-term consequences of strikes in the teaching sector do not justify their prohibition.' 60 Similarly, transport is not usually regarded as an 'essential service' for, although 'it is recognized that a stoppage in services or undertakings such as transport companies, railways… [etc] might disturb the normal life of the community, it can hardly be admitted that the stoppage of such services could cause an acute national emergency.' 61 The key exception would be air traffic control, in respect of which a minimum service or 'compensatory guarantee' of compulsory arbitration could be appropriate. 62 The Bill's treatment of schools and general transport as 'important public services' may therefore infringe Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as a disproportionate constraint on the right to strike in these sectors. 63 There may also be an infringement of the Article 11 rights of 'ancillary' workers whose role may not be critical to delivery of the public service. 64 The Government proposes that when a majority of workers in the ballot constituency are subject to a 40% threshold the entire ballot should be subjected to that threshold (as well as to the 50% turn out requirement). 65 The Consultation Paper acknowledges that this may be 'administratively difficult' for unions to calculate, but provides no compensating measures. 66 A union's records of job categories may not be up-to-date, and its records of its members' jobs may not correspond exactly to the functions and roles (and ancillary functions) to be listed in the forthcoming regulations. 67 If it holds separate workplace ballots in a strike, 68 it will need to try and perform this calculation for each workplace; 69 65 Ibid., paras. 27 -28. 66 Ibid., para. 28. 67 threshold far beyond the 'important public services' used to justify its imposition.
Unions may be forced to hold the ballot in accordance with the 40% threshold rule, knowing that if they do not do so it may be impracticable for them to demonstrate that more than half the workers in the ballot constituency were not in what the government defines as 'important public services'. That this problem may lead to injunction applications is envisaged by the Consultation, but is not a cause for concern. 70 Breach of ILO, ESC and ECHR standards in respect of ballot turnout and support thresholds
The ILO CFA has determined that pre-strike ballots are permissible in certain circumstances but only if they are 'reasonable' and do not place a 'substantial limitation' on the means of action open to trade unions. 71 These principles were applied in Case 2698 (Australia). In Australia, as in the UK, protected industrial action is dependent on a ballot being held. Section 451(9) of the Australian Fair Work Act 2009 (like proposed Clause 2 of the UK Bill) requires at least 50% of the employees on the roll of voters for the ballot to vote in the ballot. The CFA found this requirement alone to be 'excessive' and likely to hinder the right to strike particularly for large enterprises; which chimes with Darlington and Dobson's findings as to strikes in the UK. 72 This CFA decision (and others like it) 73 is not wholly determinative of whether there is a breach of the ESC or Article 11 of the ECHR, but should be highly influential.
Certainly, the ECSR has expressed considerable concern already regarding the 'excessive' and disproportionate ballot and notice requirements already in place 70 under TULRCA. 74 In interpreting Article 11, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has said that it 'can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention' as well as 'the interpretation of such elements by competent organs'. 75 It is on this basis the ECtHR has interpreted Article 11 in the light of ILO (and ESC) jurisprudence. 76 The margin of appreciation for Contracting States is wide when a measure is 'not the core but a secondary or accessory aspect of trade union activity', so that the negative assessments of the ILO monitoring bodies and the ECSR of the UK's ban on secondary action were not 'of such persuasive weight' to lead to a breach of Article 11 on the particular facts of RMT v United Kingdom. 77 But the 50% ballot thresholds affect all strikes and the 40% applies to a very wide range of public sector strikes.
Their effect is not restricted to a 'secondary aspect' of Article 11 but extends to preventing the primary action which the ECtHR in RMT saw as part of the 'very the ILO (and ESC) decisions; the high levels of the thresholds compared with other elections; the de facto serious effects of 50% turnout threshold (let alone the 40% support threshold) on the taking of primary action, striking at the very substance of Article 11; the findings of the RPC which call into question whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the amendments; the extension of the 40% threshold to any strike in which a majority of the workers are in important public services (and the administrative difficulties of calculating when it applies); the weak correlation between the aims of avoiding disruption to the public and the 40% threshold; and, last, the decision of the Government not to allow strike ballots to be held in ways which would generate broader participation than voting by post. The last factor shows clearly why, on a proportionality test, the same aims could be met in a less restrictive manner; we turn to it next.
A lack of opportunity for e-ballots and workplace ballots
While Australia was held to breach ILO standards by utilising a 50% turnout requirement, at least that country took active steps to respond to technological developments, enabling online balloting. In particular, where trade unions are willing to pay the costs of balloting themselves, they may secure participation of their members by this means. 79 The refusal to allow electronic balloting has been the subject of concern by the TUC, with Frances O'Grady asking for legislative support for such ballots in relation to industrial action. 80 Unison's response to the consultation notes that, while the Government has indicated that trade union action 79 (in albeit unspecified ways) to fraud, and he had no answer to the more general call for workplace ballots conducted by an independent scrutineer. 86 We await a fuller exploration of this issue as the Bill receives better scrutiny at later stages. -If there is a question relating to action short of a strike 'the type or types of industrial action must be specified (either in the question itself or elsewhere on the balloting paper)'; and -'the balloting paper must indicate the period or periods within which the industrial action or, as the case may be, each type of industrial action is expected to take place'.
The first of these requirements, specification of the precise nature of the trade dispute, potentially opens up the action to scrutiny under the current 'golden formula' set out in TULRCA. 88 Any hint that the dispute is in any way 'political', 87 See n.10 above. 88 TULRCA, s. 244. 'secondary', or connected to terms and conditions of future employees could bring a claim for injunctive relief by an employer. 89 In addition, employers will probably argue that the description of the dispute is insufficiently detailed, does not in fact capture all the issues in dispute, or includes matters which at the time of the ballot were no longer in dispute. As was observed in the second reading debate, 'if a failure to provide such information is to be a basis for legal action by employers against workers taking industrial action, it is crucial that the House should be informed in advance of how "reasonably detailed" is to be defined'. 90 Clause 7 requires that two weeks' notice is to be given of industrial action, double the seven days applicable at the present time. In Australia, by way of comparison, three working days' notice is required or such longer period of notice as specified in the protected industrial action ballot order. The notice period may be extended only in 'exceptional circumstances' up to seven working days. 91 By any comparative standards, the UK period of notice already seems harsh, especially when combined with the newfound ability of an employer to hire agency workers to avoid the action having any effect. 92 Moreover, Unison raise the more practical objection that a 14day notice period 'will also significantly raise the risk and likelihood of victimisation European countries, such as France and Spain, and apply in the UK to workers employed by gangmasters. 100 They protect both the right to strike and the workers, who may be in a precarious category, who are used to replace the strikers. In its manifesto the Conservative party said it would repeal this 'nonsensical' restriction. 101 The short Consultation Paper devoted to agency work claimed that repealing Regulation 7 will help employers to limit the impact of strike action, but giving only examples of strikes which affect the public. 102 The ILO expert bodies have said that requisitioning of workers to cover legal strikes should be limited to cases involving public services, essential services 'in the strict sense of the term' and cases of acute national or local crisis. 103 This type of practice, according to the CEACR, can seriously impair the right to strike. 104 102 BIS/15/416, at para. 18. 103 
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Labour Conference, 81 st Session, 1994, at para. 175. new ballot thresholds. Even where a strike has democratic legitimacy, however, the government still wants to increase employers' powers to resist it, by allowing the replacement of strikers by agency workers in all businesses, and not simply the public services referred to in the Consultation.
PICKETING AND PROTEST
In its manifesto, the Conservative party said that it would 'tackle intimidation of nonstriking workers'. 107 The relevant Consultation Paper set out two sets of proposals for 'modernising' the rules relating to picketing and protests. The first, by Clause 9 of the Bill, adds a new s.220A to TULRCA, so that picketing organised or encouraged by a trade union, will not benefit from the lawfulness shield for peaceful picketing in s.220 unless the union appoints a 'picket supervisor' and meets further conditions as to that in support of its arguments that the law of the UK on secondary action did not unduly infringe the right to strike. 118 The Bill now seeks to introduce a proposed new s.220A, which will remove the protection of s.220 from 'any picketing which a trade union organises or encourages its members to take part in' unless it meets seven conditions. 'Picketing' remains defined in terms of attendance 'at or near a place of work' in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute and for the purposes listed in s.220. Other forms of picketing are untouched: the provision is unique to union-organised or encouraged peaceful picketing.
The seven conditions which such picketing must meet to benefit from the protective shield of s.220 are the following. First, the union must appoint a person to 'supervise the picketing'. 119 Second, the person must be a union official or person who is 'familiar' with the Code of Practice on picketing. 120 Third, the union or supervisor must take reasonable steps to tell the police the supervisor's name, the picket location and how to contact the supervisor. 121 Fourth, the supervisor must have a letter of authorisation from the union. 122 The fifth, remarkable, condition requires the supervisor to show the letter not just to any constable but also to 'any other person who reasonably asks to see it'. 123 Sixth, the supervisor is plainly a dedicated person, for he or she must be present at the picket at all times or be 'readily contactable' by the union or the police 117 That is, because any inducement of breach of contract would relate to the contracts of employment of those who were not employed by A, the party to the dispute. 118 and able to attend at short notice. 124 And, seventh, the supervisor must wear a badge or other armband identifying his or her status. 125 If the union cannot comply with the provisions it is not only it which will lose the benefit of the protective shield of s.220; so will the individual pickets.
The origin of these provisions is the Code of Practice on Picketing 126 which, the Consultation Paper cheerily notes, unions mostly observe already, so that the requirements will have 'little impact on responsible picketing' but will encourage more responsible picketing among the unregenerate. 127 Yet the claim that most unions already appoint a duly qualified picket supervisor in accordance with the seven conditions in s.220A at every picket line has no empirical basis. 128 At the very least it is questionable; at most it is cynical. Take a strike on the London Underground, the railways, at a nationwide chain-store or at schools -each ticket office, each station, each shop, each school (and many more locations besides) is a workplace, at which workers are entitled to attend for lawful picketing. Where strikes in such industries are organised or encouraged by a union, it will need to train and find duly qualified supervisors who are willing to be attend what may be hundreds of sites (or try to restrict its members' right to picket at their workplaces). Data from recent strikes confirm this. 129 No union could meet such a need by full-time officials: it will have to try and rely on volunteers. Yet these volunteers must be trained and qualified. They must be prepared to advertise their trade union membership to their employer and the world by their 124 S.220A(7). Finding supervisors is not the only problem. For example, to trigger the duty it is probably sufficient that a union organises or encourages the picketing in general, based on common law agency principles where officials are involved, 131 rather than organising the particular picket line in question. Once the section is engaged, however, the union must take reasonable steps to inform the police 'where' each picket will take place -something of which it may have little knowledge. 132 In addition, the supervisor must show the appointment letter to anyone who 'reasonably asks to see it', 133 a provision which is likely to exacerbate conflict on any picket line where requests are made by the employer or, for example, security guards engaged by it..
A breach of any one of the seven conditions, 134 likely to be a fresh source of forensic disputes in injunctions, will result in the loss of the shield against the employer, even 130 See n.19 above and cf. the BIS/15/466, at 7, which blandly states that the measures are 'wholly proportionate'. 131 See Heatons Transport v TGWU [1972] ICR 308. 132 The duty is to take 'reasonable steps' to inform the police; but there is no qualification of reasonable practicability as to the information which must be provided (cf. ss. 226A(2D) and s.234A(3D) on pre-ballot notices and notices of industrial action). if it suffers no prejudice as a result, 135 and give rise to other, potentially very serious legal consequences. If the Bill's provisions are enacted, a peaceful picket of six members, not accompanied by a picket supervisor, will engage in unlawful secondary action if they induce other workers employed by a third party not to cross the picket line. The tort of inducement of breach of contract can be committed by the 'presence alone' of pickets, even without active persuasion. 136 The union will probably be liable for this tort on the basis it 'encouraged' the picketing even if it had no knowledge of the particular picket or no practical ability to appoint a qualified supervisor there. The individual pickets will lose the protective shield of s.220 even though they had no power to appoint a supervisor. So long as the union is held to have 'induced' the acts of the pickets, the pickets' industrial action will not be 'protected industrial action' within the meaning of s.238A, because the union's action will not be covered by the immunity in s. 219. 137 These consequences for a peaceful picket have nothing to do with the stated aim of the Bill, to tackle the kinds of intimidation of non-strikers referred to in the consultation, such as threats and assaults. 138 Existing criminal provisions protect against intimidation on the picket line, some of which are listed in the Consultation. 139 It is notable that in its submission to the Carr Review, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) said that the current legal framework was generally effective and did not ask for more powers, only better guidance for the police. 140 The kinds of behaviour listed in the Consultation and upon which the Government relies to justify the new section would already fall outside s.220, as well as probably amounting to torts such as public nuisance. 141 who picket peacefully, as well as those who do not. No other membership organisation which encourages a peaceful demonstration is required to police it as well or face potentially serious civil sanctions if it fails to do so (even when it is not possible or practicable for it to do so). These effects betray the Bill's true purpose: to penalise union-organised industrial action tout court.
The right to picketing is an aspect of freedom of assembly in Article 11 ECHR, which is one of the foundations of a democratic society, so that only 'convincing and compelling reasons' can justify any interference with it, including administrative rules on giving notices and the like. 142 The glib answer to the proportionality question in the ECHR Memorandum is that the new supervisor requirements are 'wholly proportionate and already reflect current practice'. 143 An adverb is often a sign of a weak contention, and this one is no exception: current practice is not to have a duly qualified picket supervisor with a letter of authorisation at every workplace where a picket may occur, whose name is provided to the police in advance, and who shows the letter to the police and any busybody when asked. In the absence of that assumption, no convincing or compelling reasons for the new section are made out. their work is administered. 145 The provisions of new s.220A will further deepen the legal division between two categories that dissolve into each other outside the court room. 146 It is little wonder that, faced with the potential legal labyrinth of Part V TULRCA, unions have increasingly resorted to 'leverage action'. Adding to those provisions only increases the pressure to abandon traditional forms of organised picketing and engage in other forms of protest, whose shape and forms are less predictable. 147
Restrictions on Protest Generally
While the legal restrictions on traditional industrial action provide an incentive to use other forms of protest, the government has no qualms about trying to restrict this too.
Further proposals in the Consultation Paper on Intimidation seek to regulate protests away from the workplace, or 'leverage' action. In support of these proposals, the Consultation refers to evidence relating to demonstrations, internet usage, protests at private residences and third party premises, all submitted by the ACPO to the Carr Review. 148 But the examples were mostly minor, such as 'playing loud music, which was interrupted by loud speaker announcements' and displaying an inflatable rat. 149 Probably in recognition of the shaky evidential foundation, the Consultation asked responders to provide examples of intimidatory behaviour 150 -hardly a signal of fair consultation, and a move criticised by the RPC. 151 145 Untroubled by a weak evidential basis, the government makes various proposals, including a possible new criminal offence of intimidation on the picket line; requiring unions to publish details of their pickets and protests to employers, the police and the CO, who is to be given an enhanced role in enforcement action; 152 and annual reporting on picketing, protests and action taken by employers in response. 153 It also proposes to up-date the Code of Practice to cover, for example social media and the rights of non-striking workers, the public and businesses. 154 As the Consultation Paper acknowledges, there already exist a number of civil penalties and criminal offences which apply to protests. 155 This is not the place to deal with the detail of the bewildering array of criminal offences regulating public protest in the UK, save to note that a wide range of behaviour is caught and that they often overlap. 156 Buttressing these offences are various provisions which give police officers wide powers to give directions to protestors and others, and to arrest those who fail to comply. 157 Nor is the civil law silent. So long as workers are not in breach of their contracts of employment, the traditional economic torts, such as inducing breach of contract, are less easily engaged. For instance, in an early example of 'leverage' action, TGWU v Middlebroook Mushrooms, 158 89 mushroom pickers dismissed for striking over a pay cut distributed leaflets outside a supermarket and in other public places, urging customers not to buy their ex-employers' mushrooms. The Court of Appeal held there 152 BIS/15/415, paras 24-29. 153 Ibid., paras 30-32. 154 Ibid., paras 33-38. 155 Ibid., para. 7. See for example the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which has both criminal and civil dimensions.
were no unlawful means for the purpose of an economic tort, making an early reference to Article 10. 159 But private nuisance will apply where there is undue interference with a person's enjoyment of his or her property, 160 and other torts, such as assault, apply to serious intimidation.
Especially since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, the courts have been engaged in the delicate process of interpreting these criminal offences and civil torts in order to ensure due respect for the rights to freedom of expression of assembly in Articles 10 and 11 ECHR respectively. This, according to the Consultation Paper, is one 'key problem': the difficulty of effective enforcement where the police are under a duty to 'facilitate lawful protests'. 161 A linked problem is that civil actions by employers can be 'time-consuming, and potentially expensive and slow'. 162 But in fact where an employer has a good claim it can obtain an interim injunction forthwith and recover its legal costs from the union: the route is no different from traditional strike injunctions which employers frequently deploy to good effect to stop strikes. The real problem lies elsewhere: that for the most part the courts have subjected injunction applications which seek to restrain protests to careful scrutiny, not simply applying the 'balance of convenience' American Cyanamid test, in order to ensure injunctions do not interfere unduly with freedom of protest or expression. 163 It is not the adequacy of the civil framework which causes the problem: it is the right to freedom of protest.
The Government's solution to this problem is to impose further burdens on one membership organisation alone: trade unions. The proposals are vague at the moment, 159 and on some there is almost no detail (such as controls on the use of social media). The most developed are those which will require a union to give 14 days' advance notice to the employer, the police and the CO of when it is to hold a protest, where it would be, how many people will be involved, whether there will be loudspeakers, whether social media will be used and so on. 164 The genesis seems to have been a suggestion made to the Carr Review from two organisations, including a medium-sized firm of commercial solicitors. 165 Despite the very large questions these proposals pose about civil liberties, police powers, their interaction with the existing criminal and civil law, and the detail of legislation, in the absence of any draft clauses the time for consultation will be short.
By the same token, there are serious issues about their compatibility with human rights law because the margin of appreciation disappears to almost vanishing point where the individual demonstrators are peaceful. 166 The ECtHR has held that duties to give prior notice of peaceful demonstrations to public authorities are permissible for reasons of public order and national security, but they must not be hidden obstacles to freedom of peaceful assembly and must allow for spontaneous protests. 167 The existing requirements in TULRCA to give 14 days' notice of ballots and industrial action have been strongly criticised as unduly burdensome by the ILO and ESC expert bodies. 168 The proposals have at best a weak connection with preserving public order; they require notice to employers, not only public bodies; if they are enacted unions 164 BIS/15/415, paras 25-29. Together with a duty on unions to provide details of their industrial will be deprived of the right to organise spontaneous demonstrations; the 14-day period of notice goes beyond the time needed for the state authorities to prepare; 169 and it is unclear why only protests organised by unions should face such bureaucratic obstacles.
The provisions also illustrate the basic unfairness in singling out union-backed protests for regulation. Let's return to a historical example of a leverage protest -Middlebrook Mushrooms -and assume the proposals were law. The union (then the TGWU) of the 89 dismissed mushroom pickers could not organise any form of protest at the time the workers were summarily dismissed, as it tried to do in the case itself.
It would need to give 14 days' notice of the planned peaceful protests outside supermarkets and in shopping precincts to the employer, the police and the CO, both reducing the impact of the protest and giving the employer time to plan its campaign or go into hiding. If the plans were not published in time to any of these bodies, the CO could issue a declaration, an enforcement order, or even a financial penalty of up to £20,000. 170 Though this would not be a 'civil offence' [sic] in its own right it would apparently assist the employer in obtaining an interim injunction. 171 No doubt in the first place the employer would make an application to the CO, an office in future to be funded by employers' associations and trade unions under other proposals in the Bill, 172 to obtain what would be in effect a form of cost-free order against the union, backed with hefty financial penalties for non-compliance.
If the sacked mushroom pickers were lucky enough to have sufficient service to bring claims of unfair dismissal, they would need to pay a substantial fee to bring a tribunal 169 The OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines recommend no more than a few days: see n.167 above, para. 116. In Aldemir (n.167 above) the period was 72 hours. 170 claim. 173 If they won, they would receive compensation capped at one year's salary which they could try to recover in a system for enforcing tribunal awards which has been shown to be woefully inadequate. 174 The need for collective protest is all the greater where the legal regime provides little practical protection for worker protest in the form of strike, but the Government nonetheless proposes to restrict this outlet too.
CONCLUSION
In the second reading in Parliament, Sajid Javid stated that the Bill was not a 'declaration of war on the trade union movement' and was not an attempt to ban industrial action. 175 Instead, it was the latest stage in a 'long journey of modernisation' which would put power in the hands of the union membership, bring 'sunlight to the dark corners of the movement', and protect the rights of the public who are affected by strikes. 176 The detailed procedures in TULRCA Part V, probably still 'the most restrictive union laws in the Western world' 177 , already ensure that strikes only take place with membership approval in a secret postal ballot, under the bright light of independent scrutiny. If the real concern of the Government were greater democracy within trade unions, the obvious step would be to allow forms of voting other than postal ballots, especially in an era when most post is junk mail, often discarded without being read.
Turnout and voting thresholds are blunt tools with which to achieve the third aim, of 173 See for a review of the impact of tribunal fees: D. Pyper and F. McGuiness, Employment Tribunal protecting the 'rights' of those affected by strikes. In some essential public services both thresholds will usually be met; in other industries where members are hard to contact by post or do not return ballot papers, the 50% requirement may operate as a bar on taking industrial action, even if there is no significant effect on third parties beyond the employer. Even where the thresholds are met, still the Government wants to introduce additional restrictions. Relying on inadequate information and assumptions, it aims to give employers greater freedom to replace strikers and wants to squeeze union-organised peaceful picketing and protest into an ever tighter legal straitjacket. The Government backs its proposals with little empirical research and skates over issues of compliance with international and European human rights standards to which the UK is a signatory. Any disruption to the public or private sphere by unions' collective action is, on this view, unacceptable or is outweighed by the interests of third parties; if this is not a war, it is odd that only unions are targeted for regulation.
Early in the second reading Javid explained how his father was helped by trade unions in the cotton mills and when a 'whites-only' policy threatened to prevent him from working as a bus driver. 178 He drew no connection between this assistance and the right to take effective collective action. But without the practical ability to strike or protest, the union's appeals on behalf of his father might well have fallen on deaf ears; future generations of exploited workers may be less fortunate, or may be forced to take action outside the remit of an unduly restrictive legal regime.
